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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(c), which 
gives the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals from juvenile court decisions. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/ STANDARDS OF REVIEW/ PRESERVATION OF 
ISSUES 
Issue 1: Did the juvenile court err in determining beyond a reasonable doubt that, 
because WEM knew prior to the day of the incident in question the alleged victim was an 
employee of a public school, even though on the day in question WEM did not even see the 
alleged victim until he was pushed into her, WEM committed assault of a public school 
..;; employee under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.3(1)? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for factual findings in non jury 
juvenile cases involving criminal violations is the "clearly erroneous" standard. In 
Interest of R.L.I., 771 P .2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1989). This standard "requires that if the 
findings ( or the trial court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of the 
-J evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict) will be set aside." Id. (citation omitted); 
see also In re S. Y.T., 2011 UT App 407,111, 267 P.3d 930. 
The standard of review for conclusions of law based on the facts is correctness. 
"[U]ltimately, the legal effect of[the] facts is the province of the appellate courts." State 
v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, 122, 144 P.3d 1096 (citation omitted); see also State ex rel. A.CM, 
2009 UT 30, 18, 221 P .3d 185 ("We review the juvenile court's interpretation of the 
Termination of Parental Rights Act for correctness."); State ex rel. D.K., 2006 UT App 
461, 17, 153 P.3d 736 ("The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a question 
of law [that] we review for correctness, affording no deference to the 0uvenile court's] 
legal conclusion."); State ex rel. R.A., 2010 UT App 71, 14,231 P.3d 808 ("We grant no 
deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts and review the decision 
regarding voluntariness for correctness."); State in Interest of MJ., 2011 UT App 398, 119, 
266 P.3d 850 ("[W]e review the juvenile court's conclusions of law for correctness and 
afford the juvenile court 'some discretion in applying the law to the facts.'") ( citation 
omitted). 
Preservation: This issue was presented to the court both in Appellant's motion for 
a directed verdict (R. 24 [Transcript] at 59-62) as well as in the closing arguments (R. 24 
[Transcript] at 103-115). 
Issue 2: Did the juvenile court error in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that on 
the morning in question the "bumping" activities of KJJ and WEM were directed toward a 
school employee? 
Standard of Review: Same as for Issue 1. 
Preservation: This issue was presented to the court both in Appellant's motion for 
a directed verdict (R. 24 [Transcript] at 59-62) as well as in the closing arguments (R. 24 
[Transcript] at 103-115). 
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Issue 3: Did the juvenile court err in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that WEM 
was actively and intentionally engaged in the so-called bumping game at the time the 
alleged assault occurred? 
Standard of Review: Same as for Issue 1. 
Preservation: This issue was presented to the court both in Appellant's motion for 
a directed verdict (R. 24 [Transcript] at 59-62) as well as in the closing arguments (R. 24 
[Transcript] at 103-115). 
Issue 4: Was the court in error in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that WEM 
solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, and/or intentionally aided KJJ in the latter's 
plan to engage in the so-called bumping game on the morning in question? 
Standard of Review: Same as for Issue 1. 
Preservation: This issue was presented to the court both in Appellant's motion 
vJJ for a directed verdict (R. 24 (Transcript) at 59-62) as well as in the closing arguments (R. 
24 [Transcript] at 103-115). 
Issue 5: Was the court in error in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that WEM 
should have been aware of or disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that KJJ 
would bump WEM into a school employee on the morning in question? 
Standard of Review: Same as for Issue 1. 
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Preservation: This issue was presented to the court both in Appellant's motion 
for a directed verdict (R. 24 [Transcript] at 59-62) as well as in the closing arguments (R. 
24 [Transcript] at 103-115). 
Issue 6: Did the court error in the way it applied the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard when weighing the evidence? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for factual findings in non jury 
criminal matters is generally the "clearly erroneous" standard. However, in juvenile court 
criminal cases, the appeals court may "otherwise reach[] a definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been made." In re D. V., 2011 UT App 241, at ,-r6. "[B]efore we can uphold 
a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the 
crime as charged from which the [ factfinder] may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 110, 999 P.2d 1252. "Under this 
less deferential standard, the likelihood that a defendant's conviction will be reversed 
following a bench trial, as opposed to ajury trial, is increased." State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 
786, 787 (Utah 1988). 
Preservation: This issue was presented to the court in the closing arguments (R. 24 
[Transcript] at 103-115). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1): 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(3): 
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 
condition. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102: 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, and 
when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense 
does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the 
offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for 
commission of the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any 
culpable mental state 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103: 
A person engages in conduct: 
1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct 
or cause the result. 
5 
2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk 
that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The 
risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
6 
@ Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall 
be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102. 
1) Assault is: (a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
or (b) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to 
another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) 
(b) 
the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
the victim is pregnant and the person has know ledge of the pregnancy. 
4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to 
another. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.3(1) 
Any person who assaults an employee of a public or private school, with knowledge 
that the individual is an employee, and when the employee is acting within the scope of his 
authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
7 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Proceedings Before the Juvenile Court 
Appellant was charged in the juvenile court of violating Section 76-2-102.3(1), 
specifically that he had assaulted a school employee. Appellant pied not guilty. The 
matter was tried to the court on July 31, 2015. After presentation of evidence and 
argument, the court found appellant guilty and imposed a sentence. The court's findings of 
fact and verdict were filed on August 7, 2015. R. at 48-53. Appellant filed his appeal on 
August 19, 2015. R. at 54-55. 
Facts: 
I. The incident in question took place on December 9, 2014 in the morning 
before school started and took place at Eisenhower Jr. High School, located in Salt Lake 
County. (R. 24 [Transcript] at I 0, 23) 
2. At the time of the incident, WEM was a student at Eisenhower Jr. High. (R. 
24 [Transcript] at 9). 
3. Because WEM took the bus to school, he arrived each morning with roughly 
one half hour to literally waste before he could go into his classroom. The school 
provided no study rooms and they had the choice of being outside (the incident occurred in 
mid-December), walking the halls, or going to the lunchroom to eat something from their 
lunch. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 23-24, 63-64). 
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4. As would be expected from junior high students who have a half hour to kill 
with no structured supervision or activity, there was sometimes a little horseplay among 
the students, sometimes consisting of a little bumping of each other as they walked the 
halls. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 30-31). 
5. The court characterized this horseplay the "bumping game." (R. 24 
[Transcript] at 116). 
6. KJJ called it "messing around" and "random." (R. 24 [Transcript] at 27, 
34). 
7. From time to time prior to December 9, 2014 WEM participated in bumping 
other students, but only with his friends. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 71-72). 
8. On the morning in question WEM never intended to bump or shove anyone. 
(R. 24 [Transcript] at 56, 65.) 
v:J 9. On the morning in question, WEM was walking with two other classmates 
along the crowded school halls when, in the course of less than one minute, he was bumped 
or shoved three times by his classmate KJJ into oncoming foot traffic. (R. 24 [Transcript] 
..j 
at 64-66.) See also Exhibit A. 
10. The first time the surveillance video provided by the prosecution (Exhibit 
·~ A) shows WEM and KJJ is at 7:31 :52 on the video clock. See Exhibit A. 
11. Other than Exhibit A, Officer Dial did not provide any surveillance video of 
either WEM or KJJ the morning of the incident. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 55-56.) 
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12. Exhibit A is not as clear and focused as the film Officer Dial reviewed. (R. 
24 [Transcript] at 56-57.) 
13. Officer Dial reviewed the clearer surveillance film he had available very 
closely. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 57 .) 
14. In reviewing the surveillance video of the morning in question, Officer Dial 
did not see any incidences of WEM shoving KJJ or purposely bumping into others. (R. 24 
[Transcript] at 56.) 
15. Officer Dial, who carefully reviewed the best surveillance film available of 
the incident, believed that WEM had been bumped by KJJ. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 59.) 
16. There was no pushing incident at all between, or involving, WEM or KJJ 
prior to 7:32:02, as recorded on the clock in the surveillance video. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 
49-51.) See also Exhibit A. 
17. The first pushing incident involving WEM and/or KJJ on December 9, 2014 
occurred at 7:32:02, the second at 7:32:17, and the third at 7:33:01, according to the clock 
in the surveillance video. See Exhibit A. 
18. On the second of these incidents, WEM ended up being bumped into 
Brenda Zimmerman, an interim vice principal. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 10, 28.) 
19. Immediately before the incident, Ms. Zimmerman had come around a 
comer going from Chall to B hall. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 13-14, 21-22, .) 
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20. Neither WEM nor KJJ saw Ms. Zimmerman until the bumping occurred. 
(R. 24 [Transcript] at 40, 65.) 
21. KJJ never intended to bump WEM into any school employee at any time. 
(R. 24 [Transcript] at 40.) 
22. WEM did not initiate the bumping and was caught by surprise each time he 
was bumped, being thrown off balance each time. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 50, 65.) See also 
Exhibit A. 
23. WEM did not bump or push KJJ back at any time on the morning in 
question. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 64.) See also Exhibit A. 
24. WEM felt embarrassed by the incident at the time. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 
65.) 
25. The court found that the incident in question was a continuation of the 
..;; earlier "bumping game." (R. 24 [Transcript] at 116.) 
26. Had WEM attempted to push or bump KJJ on the morning in question, it 
would have resulted in KJJ bumping into his girlfriend on his right and not into oncoming 
,-J 
foot traffic. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 32.) See Exhibit A. 
27. At the moment of contact between Ms. Zimmerman and WEM, Ms. 
,..J Zimmerman claimed she was knocked back a little and further claimed she felt some pain. 
(R. 24 [Transcript] at 11.) 
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28. Even though Ms. Zimmerman was walking with a teacher directly on her 
right side when she was bumped, which she says knocked her back, she did not bump into 
anyone in the crowded hall, included that teacher immediately at her right side. (R. 24 
[Transcript] at 10, 16.) 
29. Ms. Zimmerman stated WEM "lowered his shoulder" just before she was 
bumped. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 15.) 
30. Ms. Zimmerman's testimony may infer she thought that WEM's "lowering 
his shoulder" was intentional although she also admitted it was "all one continuous action." 
(R. 24 [Transcript] at 14-15.) 
31. Ms. Zimmerman turned her head immediately afterwards to see who it was 
that had bumped into her. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 11.) See Exhibit A. 
32. Ms. Zimmerman did not stop walking after being bumped but continued to 
walk down the hall. See Exhibit A. 
33. Ms. Zimmerman did not go back and question WEM or KJJ at the time of 
the incident. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 15.) 
34. WEM was not questioned about the matter by any school official until later 
that afternoon, even though Ms. Zimmerman was an intern vice-principal and had dealt 
with WEM before. (R. 24 [Transcript] at 15, 66.) 
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35. WEM did know who Ms. Zimmerman was from prior involvement with 
her, but did not see her on the morning in question until after he was pushed into her. (R. 
24 [Transcript] at 65.) 
Marshaling Evidence 
The main area where WEM takes issue with the court as to the facts found by the 
court is whether the bumping by KJJ on the morning in question was a continuation of what 
the court described as the bumping game from previous days. WEM takes the position 
that on the morning in question, WEM was not engaged in horseplay with KJJ but rather 
KJJ took it upon himself to bump or push WEM without any involvement by WEM at all. 
WEM believes he has marshaled all of the evidence bearing on the facts where there 
is a dispute as to what the true facts are or what they prove. Further, State v. Nielsen, 2014 
v;) UT 10, ,I41, 326 P.3d 645 speaks clearly on this subject: "We therefore repudiate the 
default notion of marshaling sometimes put forward in our cases and reaffirm the 
traditional principle of marshaling as a natural extension of an appellant's burden of 
persuasion. Accordingly, from here on our analysis will be focused on the ultimate 
question of whether the appellant has established a basis for overcoming the healthy dose 
..;J of deference owed to factual findings and jury verdicts-and not on whether there is a 
technical deficiency in marshaling meriting a default." 
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Thus WEM has marshaled the evidence in a way such as to show that by taking the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in this case, the State of Utah, 
there is still no basis for the court to have found the facts concerning the continuation of the 
"bumping game" the way it did. However, so that there is no question, WEM notes the 
following additional testimony found in the Transcript: 
I. Page 10, lines 3-21: 
Q Thank you. Were you involved with an incident with W on December 9, 2014? 
A Yes. 
Q Could you please describe what happened? 
A I was walking down B hall with a teacher and he was walking towards me -
Q When you say he, you're referring to? 
A WM, W was walking towards me and when we passed he ducked his shoulder down and 
shoulder bumped into me. 
Q Okay, so I see you're kind of making some movement as you're sitting there on the 
stand. We're doing an audio recording -
A Right. 
Q - so if you could try and describe that again. You said as W was passing you he lowered 
his shoulder down? 
A Yeah, so he lowered his left shoulder down and then bumped his shoulder into my left 
shoulder. 
Q And you said that this happened in the B hall? 
AB hall. 
2. Page 11, lines 1-5: 
Q And so what happened after W lowered his shoulder and bumped into your shoulder? 
A Well, it knocked me off balance, it knocked me kind of towards the wall and then I 
looked back to make sure I knew who did that and saw W and his friends walking. 
3. Page 15, lines 5-16: 
Q It was instantaneous? 
A What he did as we were passing, he lowered his shoulder and he bumped into me. 
14 
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Q I know and from the time you saw him lower his shoulder until he hit you, how long was 
that? 
A I don't know. I don't -
Q Was it instantaneous? 
A It was all one act. He lowered his shoulder and bumped into me. 
Q Okay. And so as he was lowering his shoulder he was hitting you at the same time, is that 
fair to say? 
A It was all one motion. 
4. Page 27, lines 14-24: 
We weren't like intentionally like trying to harm anybody. We didn't have a target or 
anything .... We were just goofing off ... what we were doing was like I'd bump into him and 
he'd bump into somebody else or like he'd bump into me and I'd bump into somebody 
else. It was that kind of game and like we weren't, like I said, we weren't like aiming for 
anybody. We were just kind of going around doing it. 
5. Page 28, lines 10-22: 
Q ... But why don't you just tell the Judge what happened, what you did do? 
A I was bumping into Wand he'd bump into somebody else and that's the case of this right 
now. 
Q Okay. Was one of the people that W bumped into after you bumped into him an 
employee of the school? 
A Yeah. 
Q Who was that? 
A Ms. Zimmerman. 
Q Okay. This - you called it a game you and W were doing bumping into each other, is 
that-
~ A I mean it wasn't really a game but like we didn't think - I don't know, it wasn't a game 
but like it was just goofing off. 
6. Page 29, lines 6-7 
~ Q Okay, so this game that you were doing, was this something that you had done to other 
people that day besides Ms. Zimmerman? 
A We were walking around the school kind of doing it to everybody. 
15 
7. Page 29, lines 11-12: 
Q You weren't bumping W into lockers? 
A I might have. I'm not positive but I might have. 
8. Page 31, lines 14-18: 
Q And as you were walking, who was on your right and who was - well, how were these 
two walking by your side? 
A I believe W was on the left and I know either way I was in the middle but I don't know 
what side W was actually on. But I was in the middle for sure. 
Q All right, and whose to your left? 
AW. 
Q And whose to your right? 
AT. 
Q All right. So as you're walking down if W had bumped you, who would you have 
bumped? 
A Nothing right here. We're doing it in other halls too but right here it was me bumping 
into W. 
Q All right. But on this particular - as you're going in this particular place, if W had 
bumped you who would you have bumped into? 
AT. 
9. Page 33, line 25, page 34, lines 1-6: 
Q And did you see Ms. Zimmerman before you bumped W come (inaudible)? 
A That, I mean I might have, I'm not sure. It was awhile ago and like I said we were just 
kind of doing it to random people, we weren't really targeting anybody. 
Q That's the question, did you target Ms. Zimmerman? 
ANo. 
IO.Page 36, lines 8-9: 
Q In any of that film did you see W bumping into you? 
ANo. 
I I .Page 40, lines 3-17: 
Q No, I meant that morning, that morning as you were - well, just seconds before this 
incident occurred, when was the first time you saw her? 
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~ A Probably that time when we were going through that hall. 
Q Okay. And did you see her before you pushed or bumped W? 
A Ummm, obviously not because I wouldn't have bumped him if I would have seen her. 
Q Would you ever intentionally yourself bump into a school employee? 
A Like what do you mean? 
(;i) Q Would you purposely shoulder check a school employee? 
A No. 
12. Page 64, lines 19-25, page 65, lines 1-20: 
Q Okay. And on the day in question would you describe what you were doing just prior to 
the incident with Ms. Zimmerman? 
A Walking the halls. 
Q Okay. And had you shoved anybody that day? 
ANo. 
Q All right. And as you were getting started for school, had you talked with K about 1 
pushing anybody? 
ANo. 
Q Was it your desire to bump into anybody that day, that is to say jostle one into the other? 
ANo. 
Q All right. Do you recall what happened as you were walking down B hall that morning? 
AK shoved me into Ms. Zimmerman. 
Q At what point did you see Ms. Zimmerman? 
A When I bumped into her. 
Q All right. And had you had any pre-arrangement to be bumped into people? 
ANo. 
Q And as you bumped into Ms. Zimmerman, how long before you bumped into her did you 
first see her? 
A When I bumped into her. I turned around to see who it was. 
Q All right. So at the time you were being bumped had you seen Ms. Zimmerman? 
ANo. 
13.Page 71, line 16-21: 
·>Ii Q Okay. So when K testified - and you were here when he testified, you heard him talking 
about this game that you play where he shoves you into somebody or you shove him into 
somebody, that was correct that you guys had done this in the past, right? 
A I have never shoved anyone. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
WEM, the appellant in this case, was charged with the crime of assault of a school 
employee. The sole basis for the claim was that WEM was pushed into a school employee 
by a fellow student, with whom he had participated in horseplay acts of pushing and 
bumping between students on earlier occasions but not on the day in question. As part of 
that claim, the State further claimed that even though WEM did not even see, much less 
recognize the school employee until the incident had occurred, because he knew who she 
was from prior encounters, the crime was committed. 
It is WEM' s position that neither the facts, even when viewed from the standpoint of 
the State, nor the law provide support for a finding of assault of a school employee by 
WEM. There was no evidence presented that WEM had any intent, either on that day or 
earlier, to ever assault a school employee or be involved with any conduct that would result 
in an assault of a school employee. Moreover, with regard to the specific incident, neither 
WEM nor KJJ, the student who pushed WEM, saw the school employee until after the 
incident occurred. Because KJJ in pushing WEM was not at any time targeting school 
employees and did not even see the school employee in question until the incident 
occurred, that conduct does not meet the requirements of Section 76-5-102.3(1). 
It is not disputed that WEM was pushed and did no pushing. Thus he can only be 
convicted of the assault if his behavior meets the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-2-202, namely that he solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally 
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~ aided KJJ to engage in that pushing activity. No such proof exists, much less proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. At most there was some horseplay on earlier days involving 
KJJ, WEM and some other students, but not on the day in question. Thus because WEM 
had no active involvement in bringing about the contact between himself and the school 
employee, because he did not encourage KJJ to do so, and because neither WEM nor KJJ 
were targeting any school employee, there was no basis to find WEM guilty of an assault of 
a school employee. 
Finally, the court's findings are totally lacking in identifying what conduct of 
WEM, when measured by the reasonable doubt standard, supported the guilty verdict. 
Therefore, the finding that WEM assaulted a school employee should be reversed 
and the case should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. There Was no Intent By KJJ or WEM to Assault a School Employee 
This case was brought solely under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.3(1). The court in 
making its findings and order did not identify any other statute on which it rested its finding 
of guilt of an assault of a school employee. However counsel for the State, in arguing in 
response to WEM' s motion for a directed verdict as well as in the closing argument, did 
identify several statutes which supposedly explained the basis why WEM, although not the 
actor but the one acted upon, could be determined to have the requisite mens rea to permit 
a finding of assault of a school employee. Presumably the court accepted those statutory 
references and the interpretation given them by the prosecutor. Therefore, it is important 
for this court to review the various sections of the Utah Code cited to the juvenile court and 
the interpretation given them by the prosecutor. 
As noted, the specific and only charge was pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-102.3(1 ). There appears to be no case law interpreting or applying Section 
76-5-102.3(1), which was enacted in the 1992 session of the Legislature and has not been 
amended since. Thus this case appears to be one of first impression as to this statute. 
There are, however, approximately 30 states which have statutes that pertain to assault of a 
school employee ( either specifically or as a school employee being a public official). The 
vast majority of these statutes have an intent element expressly stated or have been found to 
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\&,I require an intent element. 1 No intent by WEM to assault the school employee in question 
was ever established. 
To address the issue of intent, the court referred to WEM's earlier involvement with 
a "bumping game" which was directed against other students. To find the necessary 
intent element, the court concluded that the earlier participation in the bumping game, 
involving only students, was sufficient intent to prove assault of a school employee. 
However, that finding completely ignores the doctrine of transferred intent. In a New 
York case directly on point, the court found that intent by a student to cause physical injury 
to another student did not transfer to a teacher whom the student did injure. Specifically 
the court addressed "transferred intent" as follows: "The doctrine of transferred intent 
'serves to ensure that a person will be prosecuted for the crime he or she intended to 
commit even when, because of bad aim or some other 'lucky mistake,' the intended target 
1 The following is a sampling of similar statutes in other jurisdictions: 
Ala Code 13A-6-2l(a)(5) 
Ariz Rev State 13-1204(A)(8)( d) 
Cal Penal 243.6 
Ga Code Ann 16-5-23(i) 
Haw. Rev. Stat. 707-71 l(l)(e) 
720 Ill. Comp State. 5/12-4(b)(3) 
Ind. Code 35-42-2-l(a)(2)(G) 
Kan Stat Ann 21-3443(a) 
Mass Gen Laws ch. 265, § 13D 
Minn Stat 609 .2231, subd 5 
Nev Rev. Stat 200.471(2)(c) 
N.M. Stat. Ann 30-3-9(B)(l) 
Ohio Rev Code Ann 2903.13(C)(2)(e) 
Okl St Ann tit 21, §650.7(C) 
18 Pa. cons. Stat §2702(a)(5) 
R.I. Gen Laws 11-5-7 
Va Code Ann 18.2-57(0) 
W. Va. Code 61-2-15(b)(2) 
21 
was not the actual victim' (People v. Fernandez, 88 N.Y.2d 777, 781, 650 N.Y.S.2d 625, 
673 N.E.2d 910). Here, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that respondent's 
intended target was the teacher, and thus there is no basis under the doctrine of transferred 
intent for prosecuting respondent for the crime of assaulting a teacher." In re Jenna V., 55 
A.D.3d 1341, 1342, 864 N.Y.S.2d 637 (2008). 
It is clear from the facts that prior to WEM being bumped into Ms. Zimmerman, 
neither KJJ nor WEM saw her coming around the comer from C hall to B hall, walking in 
their opposite direction. Even Ms. Zimmerman's testimony confirms this fact. She said 
that immediately before the incident she had been coming around a comer, that the incident 
was "all one motion" and "all one act," and that she had to look back to see who did it. R. 
24 [Transcript] at 10-11, 15. 
Note that Ms. Zimmerman herself did not know who it was who bumped into her 
until after the incident. Thus even though she knew WEM quite well from having met 
with him previously, she did not know on the morning in question who bumped into her 
until the incident was completed. This fully supports the contention of WEM about Ms. 
Zimmerman not being a target. 
The reasoning of In re Jenna V. applies to the claim against WEM. There is no 
question that the intended targets ofKJJ were other students, but never a school employee. 
Moreover, WEM had no intended targets at all. Thus the intent by KJJ to bump WEM 
into other students cannot be transferred to a bump into a school employee. For the same 
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~ reason, there can be no intent ascribed to WEM to assault a school employee. Assuming, 
but not admitting, that at the time WEM was indeed playing the "bumping game," it was 
directed only against other students and not against school employees. Thus no violation 
of Section 76-5-102.3(1) occurred. 
II. It was Improper for the Court to Tie WEM's Prior "Bumping Activity" to 
His Being Bumped into a School Employee 
In order to apply Section 76-5-102.3(1) to WEM, the court had to find a connection 
between WEM's prior "bumping" activity and the bumping of the school employee on 
involved. To do so, the court started from the position that any bumping activity could 
have unintended consequences, namely that other persons might end up getting bumped in 
~ the process. Then because WEM knew Ms. Zimmerman from prior involvement with her, 
when WEM got bumped into her on the day in question, and because his getting bumped 
into her was "part of the bumping game" which had taken place on earlier days, the court 
found WEM guilty of assault of a school employee. That is an interpretation which can 
only be made if the plain language of the statute is construed beyond its clear meaning. 
In oral argument, the prosecutor argued that it is sufficient to find assault if a school 
employee is bumped, regardless of the mens rea or the intent of the actor to direct any 
conduct against a school employee. See argument at pages 62 and 115 of the Transcript. 
Specifically at page 62 the prosecutor said: "I don't think that there's anything in the 
statute that says they need to specifically target a school employee, it's just that it's an 
assault of a school employee." Essentially the same argument was then remade in the 
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closing argument by the prosecutor. In denying the motion for directed verdict, the court 
did not discuss the argument by either side or otherwise provide any reason at all for 
denying the motion. The court also did not explain how the fact that neither KJJ nor 
WEM targeted the school employee still allowed a finding of guilt. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.3(1) does not involve strict liability. Therefore under 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102, there must be proof of intent, knowledge, or recklessness. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 defines those three terms. Presumably the juvenile court 
intended to apply the recklessness standard because there clearly was no suggestion, much 
less proof, of intent or knowledge. 
Utah courts make a critical distinction between criminal negligence, which 
"attaches where the defendant 'ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk,"' 
and "criminal recklessness, knowledge, and intent[, all of which] require actual knowledge 
or awareness." State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, ~ 12 n.5, 14 P.3d 114, 125 ajfd, 
2002 UT 80, 52 P.3d 1276; see also State v. Liti, 2015 UT App 186, ~ 16, 355 P.3d 1078 
("Our case law recognizes that the nature of the risk involved in both criminal negligence 
and recklessness is the same; "the only difference between the two is whether the 
defendant was aware of that risk.") (emphasis added.) In order to find WEM guilty in this 
case, the juvenile court was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that WEM had 
knowledge or was aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that he would be pushed 
into a school employee. No such awareness can be shown or even inferred from the facts 
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~ of the case, particularly when measured by the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Because WEM was not actually aware that he was going to be pushed into a school 
employee, he cannot be found guilty. See State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, 14 n.l, 993 P.2d 
854 ("[A] crime consists in the concurrence of prohibited conduct [the bad act] and a 
culpable mental state [the mens rea].") (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
It is submitted that the plain elements of the law were not met when there was no 
evidence that either KJJ or WEM targeted Ms. Zimmerman and indeed did not even know 
she was walking around the comer. The motion for directed verdict should have been 
granted and the finding of guilt should be reversed. 
III. The Association Element Was Never Established. 
The juvenile court determined that on the morning in question, WEM was 
associating with KJJ in the "bumping game." Although the court did not cite any 
vi authority for that finding, and even though multiple witnesses testified that WEM himself 
,_J 
did not do any pushing, he was apparently convicted on the basis of Section Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-202 which requires the one being charged with the offense to have solicited, 
requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes the offense. But the record is totally devoid of proof of any 
~ such solicitation, requests, commands, encouragement, or intentional aiding on the 
morning in question and specifically at the time in question. Note further the unequivocal 
language of Section 76-2-202 which requires WEM to have been "acting with the mental 
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state required for the commission of an offense." No such mental state was proven by 
testimony from anyone. Moreover, Section 7 6-2-202 also uses the significant 
requirements of "solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids." That is 
not language describing the situation at hand. The statute requires some clear 
involvement by WEM. None was established. WEM did not solicit, request, command, 
encourage or intentionally aid KJJ in the pushing incident. 
At best WEM knew that it was possible KJJ might on a given morning push him into 
other students. However, that knowledge is not active involvement with KJJ and is 
insufficient to meet the requirements of Section 76-2-202. "To show that a defendant is 
guilty under accomplice liability, the State must show that an individual acted with both the 
intent that the underlying offense be committed and the intent to aid the principal actor in 
the offense." State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, 113, 197 P.3d 628." (citing State v. Schreuder, 
726 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Utah 1986) ("Prior knowledge does not make a person an 
accomplice when that person does not have the mental state required and does not solicit, 
request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid in perpetration of the crime.") The 
court went on to say: "An accomplice must therefore have the intent that the underlying 
offense be committed." Id. at 114. There is nothing in the record which shows WEM 
had any idea that on the morning in question he would be bumped into anyone, much less a 
school employee. Nor did WEM have the intent that such be done. 
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Precedence clearly shows that the "[m]ere presence, or even prior knowledge, does 
not make one an accomplice to a crime absent evidence showing--beyond a reasonable 
doubt--that [a] defendant advised, instigated, encouraged, or assisted in perpet[ r ]ation of 
the crime." In re V. T, 2000 UT App 189, ,I 11. The V. T case is directly on point. There, 
this court concluded that a juvenile defendant's presence during and after a theft did not 
support a conclusion that he was an accomplice because no evidence suggested his active 
involvement." WEM' s prior activities and his presence on the day in question walking 
with KJJ is not enough for him to be found as an accomplice, particularly when there is no 
evidence of an active involvement by him. 
IV. WEM Engaged in no Voluntary Act of Pushing 
"An individual must act willfully to be criminally liable ... This means that the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused 'desire[ d] to engage in 
-~ the conduct or cause the result.' State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Utah 1993) 
( citation omitted). For WEM to be found guilty, he would have had to act willfully; and 
act is defined as a voluntary bodily movement. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-601(1). As is 
abundantly clear in this case, WEM did not voluntarily get pushed into a school employee. 
There is also a serious question whether he even understood he would be pushed at all. He 
and KJJ had walked the halls that morning without incident. Then in the space of 15 
seconds he was pushed twice, with the second push knocking him into Ms. Zimmerman. 
That does not translate to voluntarily engaging in a "bumping game." There is no 
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evidence at all that he knew he would be pushed that morning and more specifically that he 
would be pushed into a school employee. 
V. The.Court Misinterpreted the Law of Assault of a School Employee 
The ultimate ruling was that if students are engaged in friendly pushing with friends 
and in the process one of the students is bumped into a school employee, such conduct 
constitutes assault of a school employee. Assuming, but not conceding, such is the case2, 
the further question is whether, and aside from the transferred intent argument made above, 
if one does not know that at the time of the action the person being assaulted is a school 
employee, whether that can constitute an assault under Utah Code Ann §76-5-102.3. 
example, if the lights in the school suddenly went out, and one student pushed another 
For 
student as a form of game and in the process the person being pushed then bumped into a 
school employee who had just come into the room unseen, does that constitute a violation 
under the statute? WEM would strongly argue that because there was no way for the 
students to know that a school employee would be ultimately bumped, the elements of the 
statute have not been met. That is true even if the student being pushed was actively 
engaged in a "bumping game." 
2 Judge May made it clear he felt he was bound to find WEM guilty because of what he 
thought the law said. His exact words were: "And I do sympathize and agree with Mr. Rust that 
this doesn't seem like a Class A Misdemeanor. It's - anyone who's dealt with 13-year old boys 
knows what the bumping game is. I think any by [sic] who's been 13 has either played it or been 
part of it. Nevertheless, this is what the elements of law have been met." Transcript page 117. 
However, as Charles Dickens' character Mr. Bumble said in the book of Oliver Twist: "If the law 
supposes that, the law is a ass-a idiot." 
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It must be remembered that Section 76-5-102.3 is in the general criminal code and 
therefore applies to adult as well as to juvenile court cases. Thus, the Legislature must 
have been concerned that school employees were being singled out to be assaulted, perhaps 
by irate parents, and as a result needed special protection. This special protection status 
should, however, be coupled with a strict and narrow interpretation rule. Statutes "giving 
special privileges must be construed strictly." Moran v. Miami Cnty. Comm'rs, 67 U.S. 
722, 723, (1862); see also Asbury v. Town of Albemarle, 78 S.E. 146, 148 (N.C. 1913) 
("Statutes ... conferring special privileges are to be construed liberally in favor of the 
public and strictly against those specially favored."); Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. 
Rawly, 2 La. Ann. 372,373 (La. 1847) ("[S]pecial statutes, those granting peculiar 
privileges to certain classes or persons ... are to be strictly construed .... "); Aycrigg v. 
United States, 124 F. Supp. 416,417 (N.D. Cal. 1954) ("It is hornbook law that any statute 
...j which grants a special privilege is to be strictly construed against the grantee."). 
The statute in question not only gives special protection to teachers but also 
provides for heightened penalties. The law under which WEM was charged classifies the 
crime as a Class A misdemeanor. The general law on assault, which gives no special 
treatment to school employees, classifies the crime a Class B misdemeanor unless the 
perpetrator "causes substantial bodily injury to another." Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102. 
There is no question that Ms. Zimmerman was not substantially injured. Seconds later she 
showed no pain as she continued down the hall, nor did she seek medical help. Rather she 
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felt momentary pain, which she described as "when someone hits your arm hard." R. 24 
[Transcript] at 11. 
Because WEM was tried and found guilty under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.3(1), a 
Class A misdemeanor, rather than under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102, a Class B 
misdemeanor, he was required as part of his sentence to be fingerprinted and provide a 
DNA sample, a condition the prosecutor specifically called to the attention of the court. 
R. 24 [Transcript] at 118. Because of that special status given the law under which WEM 
was charged and found guilty, the court should have given strict interpretation to it. In this 
case a strict interpretation of the statute would have barred the claim brought against 
WEM. That law should apply only when at the time of the incident the actor knows his 
conduct is being directed towards a school employee. Since that was not the case here, the 
ruling from the juvenile court should have been not guilty. 
VI. The Court Failed to Find Evidence Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
A finding of assault is a serious matter, whether it involves adults or juveniles. 
Such findings should be made only on the basis of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In that regard, the decisions of trial courts conducting bench criminal trials are given less 
deference than the decisions of juries deciding criminal trials. Nowhere did the juvenile 
court address the evidence in light of the beyond a reasonable doubt burden. WEM 
strongly argues that this burden was never met by the State and the case should be 
overturned, particularly in light of the clear facts of this case. 
30 
In the case of In re D. V., 2011 UT App 241, the court held: "When reviewing a 
bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless 
it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[] a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. at ,6. In that regard it is important to note 
that "before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence 
concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the [ factfinder] may base its 
conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, ,10, 
999 P.2d 1252. "Under this less deferential standard, the likelihood that a defendant's 
conviction will be reversed following a bench trial, as opposed to a jury trial, is increased." 
State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1988). 
This court can look in vain at the record and the findings of the juvenile court to find 
evidence that creates reasonable doubt as to whether the crime being charged was 
..;;; committed. Thus, as in In re D. V., this court should find that "the evidence was not 
sufficient to support a finding of [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt." In re D. V. at ,21. 
VII. Justice Requires a Reversal of This Case 
As noted, WEM fits into that category of socially challenged persons, known as 
adolescents. By any standard, such individuals are trying to find a way to cope with 
~ moving from being children to becoming adults. They are faced with dealing with their 
peers who sometimes bully them and who sometimes they bully. They are often shy but 
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seek acceptance and attention. In this whole process they should not find themselves 
being treated as criminals by school officials simply because of their youthful exuberance. 
The law being applied in this case is criminal law, applicable to people of all ages. 
The Legislature has seen fit so far not to make any distinction in the standards in the law 
between adults and juveniles. However, justice requires this court to at least consider the 
age and background ofWEM when applying matters of intent, particularly considering the 
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice requires that in a case such as this, 
reasonable doubt should play a major role. 
The school saw fit to send this case to the juvenile court when by all educational 
standards it should have been handled in the school system. The school chose to not 
provide any meaningful activity for the students in the roughly 30 minutes they were in the 
school until classes started. Students were not even given a warning about the bumping 
game. However, apparently the school expected these students not to engage in any type 
of "messing around" activities among friends while walking the halls with nothing to do. 
The only reason WEM was convicted of assaulting a school employee was that he 
was an instrument used by another student, KJJ, to carry out what in KJJ' s mind was a 
harmless game between students with no intention to involve or hurt school employees. 
WEM did not actively participate in the pushing game on the morning in question. He did 
not push any other students into oncoming traffic. He was a victim of a game being 
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vu carried out by another student. As a matter of justice, his conduct cannot constitute an 
assault of a school employee. 
VIII. There was No Basis For the School to Refer This Case to the Juvenile Court 
This case is as much an indictment of the education system as it is of the criminal 
and juvenile court system. The juvenile court in its ruling admitted that young people in 
junior high sometimes engage in horseplay. It is also instructive to note that the person 
who claims to be a victim was at the time acting as a vice-principal with responsibility for 
discipline. If Ms. Zimmerman thought there was a problem in the way a student bumped 
into her, she should have immediately turned around, confronted the students involved, and 
sought to resolve the matter in an administrative but constructive manner. Instead, as she 
testified, she had no conversation whatsoever with the students involved, but rather filed 
some kind of complaint with the principal. This led to a meeting with another 
.j; vice-principal with a police officer present, all before the students even had a chance to 
explain themselves. 
This kind of knee-jerk reaction, turning a simple student incident of, at worst, 
horseplay into a criminal action was recently addressed by the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeal in Hawker v. Sandy City, 10th Cir. Ct. App, 2014, case No. 13-4139. In that 
unpublished but instructive decision, Justice Lucero stated: "Referral of students to law 
enforcement-so that even minor offenses are often dealt with and punished by police 
rather than school officials-is a key and growing feature of modern school disciplinary 
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policies." He noted further: "Strict disciplinary policies coupled with the involvement of 
the criminal justice system in schools have recently gained a name: the school-to-prison 
pipeline .... Over the last two decades, experts from many fields have documented the 
myriad negative consequences of the school-to-prison pipeline. In addition to missing 
school when they are suspended or expelled, students who experience the harsh effects of 
these policies are more likely to struggle in classes, drop out, and suffer other negative 
effects on their educations .... Our present jurisprudence is sending the wrong message to 
schools. It makes it too easy for educators to shed their significant and important role in 
that process and delegate it to the police and courts." 
Ironically since the trial of this case, the "clock boy case" has attracted nation-wide 
attention. That was the incident where a school in Texas and the local police probably 
overreacted when a high school student brought his homemade clock to school. After the 
media outburst, even the President of the United States invited him and his clock to come 
to the White House. Appellant does not ask for a White House visit, but he does ask that 
his being pushed by a fellow student should not rise to the level of a crime. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the charges against WEM, claiming an assault of a school employee, were 
never proven pursuant to the plain language of the law and the cases interpreting the law, 
particularly in light of the evidentiary burden of beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict of 
the juvenile court should be overturned and the case should be dismissed with prejudice. 
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not doing that at all. By W's own testimony and by W's own 
admission he has admitted to misconduct. He admitted that 
people could get hurt in the behavior that he was engaging 
in. He admitted that it could cause pain. So at the very 
least, he's admitted to engaging in reckless conduct. 
Someone being shoved, and as the Court has already 
pointed out, Mr. Rust is arguing that there's no indication 
that Ms. Zimmerman was specifically targeted but again, the 
State's response is she does not have to be specifically 
targeted. The fact is that an assault occurred on Ms. 
Zimmerman, W knew that she was a school employee, that 
conduct was, at the very least reckless and based on the law 
Your Honor, we'd ask that the law and the statutes the State 
has provided, we'd ask that Your Honor find the (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I just received a 
note that I have another protective order that I have to go 
take care of and then while I'm back there I'm going to go 
back over the exhibits. I want to make sure I have all of 
them. Are there any over there that I can't see? It seems 
like there's another page to this one somewhere. Okay. 
And then I'll come back in and render a decision. 
So it'll be at least 20 minutes to do the protective order 
and go over everything. So ... 
{Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. I've had an 
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opportunity to go over my notes and the exhibits and also 
view the statutes involved. I find the following has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Ms. Zimmerman was an assistant principal at 
Eisenhower Junior High. W knew Ms. Zimmerman was a school 
employee and had had dealings with her in the past in that 
capacity. W engaged in what I will call the bumping game 
with his friends on more than one occasion. W knew that the 
bumping game could result in someone getting hurt. 
On December 9th , Wand his friends were - maybe not 
friends at this point - K were playing the bumping game at 
the Eisenhower Junior High. At least three incidents of the 
bumping game occurred that morning, one before the incident 
involving Ms. Zimmerman, the incident involving Ms. Zimmerman 
and the one after that incident with Ms. Zimmerman. And 
while playing the bumping game W dipped his shoulder and 
struck Ms. Zimmerman. The force of the impact knocked her 
off balance. She felt as if she had been hit hard and caused 
her bodily pain. 
The requirements for assault against a school 
employee is that any person who assaults a public employee. 
So we have to look at.what assault is. The definition of 
assault is an act committed - one of the definitions - an act 
committed with unlawful force or violence that causes bodily 
injury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily 
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injury and bodily injury is defined as pain. So there was an 
assault an employee. W again had knowledge that the 
individual was an employee. The employee was acting in the 
scope of her authority as she's testified and I'll find also 
that she was walking up and down the halls as was one of her 
normal obligations as an assistant principal. 
So I'll find that W, that you are guilty of assault 
against a school employee. 
Now, the legislature has stated that this is a 
Class A Misdemeanor. It doesn't give me any discretion. It 
says it's a Class A Misdemeanor. Where I do have discretion 
is in sentencing. And I do sympathize and agree with Mr. 
Rust that this doesn't seem like a Class A Misdemeanor. It's 
- anyone whose dealt with 13-year old boys knows what the 
bumping game is. I think any by whose been 13 has either 
played it or been part of it. Nevertheless, this is what the 
elements of law have been met. So I do have discretion again 
as I say as far as sentencing goes. 
W, can you please stand? 
This is your sentence W. You're going to write a 
letter of apology to Ms. Zimmerman. You're going to turn 
that in to the State within 10 days, does that give you 
enough time? Ten days. Normally for a Class A Misdemeanor 
the standard fine is $375, 60 hours of community service and 
we talk about detention time. I'm going to give you 20 hours 
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of community service and you have to do that within 60 days. 
I'll give you five suspended days of detention, 
meaning those days hang over your head. So you only go to 
detention if you refuse to follow my orders. That's it. 
MS. DAUGHERTY: And Your Honor, given that this is 
a Class A DNA is mandatory. 
THE COURT: He's 15. I thought he was a bit 
younger. I don't have discretion. You have to provide DNA, 
fingerprint and photographs. There's a $150 collection fee, 
you'll have to pay that. I don't have discretion to waive 
it. But I'm not imposing any fines. You have 60 days to 
take care of that. 
Anything else today? 
MR. RUST: Yes, Your Honor, the community service, 
is that under anybody's particular direction? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. RUST: It has to be under the probation 
officer's direction? 
THE COURT: Well -
MR. RUST: In other words -
THE COURT: - normally what happens is you provide 
him with what you want to do and we'll let you know if it's 
appropriate. You can't babysit your sister. I mean, that's 
not community service. But anything else usually, just about 
anything else goes. But, yes, he needs to run it by the 
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FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of Minutes, Findings, and Order 
Mclachlan, Wyatt Eric 05-31-2000 Case No. 1108641 
A person under the age of 18 years 
Before Judge Mark W. May on July 31, 2015 
This case came before the Court for a hearing on the following: 
Case Number 1108641, Wyatt Mclachlan 
2 -ASSAULT AGAINST SCHOOL EMPLOYE (Class A Misdemeanor) -Trial 
MINUTES: 
Present: 
Wyatt Eric Mclachlan, Minor 
Alan M Milburn, Probation Officer 
Joseph C Rust, Attorney -- On Behalf Of The Minor 
Mikelle C Daugherty, Attorney -- On Behalf Of The State 
Patty Mclachlan, Mother 
Weston Mclachlan, Father 
Steven Nelson - On Behalf of the State 
Other interested parties 
The matter came before the Court for trial. 
The Court addressed preliminary matters. 
The Court invoked the Exclusionary Rule. 
Ms. Daugherty gave opening statements. 
Mr. Rust gave opening statements. 
The State called Brenda Zimmerman to the stand. (1:43:55 -2:08:36 PM) 
Continued on next page 
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The witness was sworn and testified. 
The witness identified Wyatt Eric Mclachlan. 
The witness was excused. 
The State called Kaden Jensen to the stand. (2:08:51 - 2:37:28) 
The witness was sworn and testified. 
The witness identified Wyatt Eric Mclachlan. 
Mr. Rust moved the Court to admit Exhibit# 3 into evidence. 
There were no objections. 
Exhibit 3 was accepted into evidence. 
Mr. Rust moved the Court to admit Exhibit IB (pages 4 and 5) into evidence. 
There were no objections. 
Exhibit IB (pages 4 and 5) were accepted into evidence. 
The witness was excused. 
The State called Lee Dial to the stand. (2:37:32 - 3:02:41) 
The witness was sworn and testified. 
The witness identified Wyatt Eric Mclachlan. 
Ms. Daugherty moved the Court enter exhibit A into evidence. 
There were no objections. 
Exhibit A was accepted into evidence. 
The Court recessed. (2:49:55) 
Continued on next page 
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The Court resumed. (2:57:06) 
The witness was excused. 
The State rested. 
Mr. Rust moved the Court for a directed verdict. 
The Court denied Mr. Rust's motion. 
Mr. Rust called Wyatt Eric Mclachlan to the stand. (3:09:00 - 3:23:33) 
The witness was sworn and testified. 
Mr. Rust moved the Court to enter exhibit 2C into evidence. 
There were no objections. 
Exhibit 2C was accepted into evidence. 
The witness was excused. 
Mr. Rust called Jackson Graham to the stand. (3:24:06 - 3:28:02) 
The witness was sworn and testified. 
The witness was excused. 
Mr. Rust called Kyle Wilkins to the stand. (3:28:09 - 3:32:28) 
The witness was sworn and testified. 
The State objected to the witness and gave basis. 
The witness was excused. 
Mr. Rust called Sherri Branch to the stand. (3 :32:31 - 3 :56:50 ) 
Continued on next page 
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The witness was sworn and testified. 
The witness was excused. 
Mr. Rust rested. 
The State gave dosing arguments. 
Mr. Rust gave closing arguments. 
The Court recessed. (4:17:36) 
The Court resumed. (4:53:38) 
The Court addressed and accepted comments from all parties present. 
Exhibits: 
EXHIBIT Number 3 (Text Messages) was submitted by Joseph Rust and was received, reviewed, and accepted ~ 
into evidence. 
EXHIBIT Number lB (pgs. 4 & 5) (Granite School District Statement) was submitted by Joseph Rust and was 
received, reviewed, and accepted into evidence. 
EXHIBIT Number A (Security Video of Eishehower Jr. High) was submitted by Mikelle Daugherty and was 
received, reviewed, and accepted into evidence. 
EXHIBIT Number 2C (Cigar Wrappers) was submitted by Joseph Rust and was received, reviewed, and 
accepted into evidence. 
FINDINGS: 
The Court finds the allegations contained in the petition to be true and correct as alleged beyond a reasonable 
doubt and that said juvenile comes within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Act of the State of Utah as 
amended to date. 
Continued on next page 
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ORDERS: 
Wyatt Eric Mclachlan is to write a letter of apology to Brenda Zimmerman, due to the Court within 10 days. 
Wyatt Eric Mclachlan is to complete 20 community service hours on or before September 30, 2015. 
Wyatt Eric Mclachlan is committed to detention for 5 days. This order is hereby suspended upon compliance of 
the courts orders. 
Wyatt Eric Mclachlan is ordered to provide a DNA saliva specimen to a designated employee of this court 
within 120 days. Wyatt Eric Mclachlan is ordered to pay a fee of $150.00 for obtaining and processing a DNA 
sample. Fee is to be paid on or before September 30, 2015. 
Wyatt Eric Mclachlan is to be photographed by a designated Juvenile Court employee within 120 days of this 
order. 
Wyatt Eric Mclachlan is to be fingerprinted by a designated employee of Juvenile Justice Services at the local 
detention center within 120 days of this order. Wyatt Eric Mclachlan may also be fingerprinted at a local law 
enforcement agency and pay any applicable fees. If fingerprinting is done at a local law enforcement agency, 
Wyatt Eric Mclachlan must provide verification of the fingerprinting to the Court within 120 days of this order. 
All previous orders of the Court consistent with this order are hereby continued. 
A non appearance Exparte Review hearing is set for 10-02-2015. 
Failure to comply with the above order may result in your being found in contempt of court, the loss of your 
,_;, driver license, and/or forfeiture of any or all of your Utah State Income Tax Refund. 
Copy of this court order is your personal notice to appear for the above hearing. You will not receive further 
notice. 
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You may have the right to appeal this matter to the Utah State Court of Appeals. Appeals must be filed within 
30 days from the date of this order. 
Recorded by M. Caffee 
BY THE COURT 
Digitally signed by 
MarkWMay 
and filed on 08-07-2015 
MWM 1 :38:56 - 2:49:55; 2:57:06 - 4: 17:36; 4:46:49 
CC: Patty and Weston 4503 S 3200 W West Valley City UT 84119 
DA 
Joseph Rust, esq 
Payments can be made at http://www.utcourts.gov/epayments/. 
To access other case information obtain a PIN number from the court. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by U.S. Mail two true and correct 
,...s. '-
copies of BRIEF OF APPELLANT W.E.M., this _.-b_"'day of November, 2015 to: 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
Criminal Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
criminalappeals@utah.gov 
